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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises out of a Determination of Deficiency Determination made by the
Idaho State Tax Comnission, hereinafter "Tax Commission," determining that
Petitioners, Gracie, LLC and Barnes & Barnes Enterprises, LLC, hereinafter colIectively,
"Planet Beach," owe use tax for tanning and spa equipment purchased by Planet Beach
for their spas. Planet Beach protested the detennination before the Tax Commission and
the Tax Commission upheld the determination of deficiency. Planet Beach then filed a
Petition for Judicial Review in the district court to appeal that detennination of
deficiency. On December 24,2008, the district court filed its Memorandum Decision and
Order upholding the Tax Commission's detennination of deficiency.
B.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE TAX COMMISSION
1.

On March 20,2007, the Tax Commission issued a Notice of Deficiency

Determination against Petitioner, Barnes & Barnes Enterprises, LLC stating that
Petitioner, Barnes & Barnes Enterprises, LLC owed $1,3 15.00 for use taxes and interest
owed on equipment purchased for its Planet Beach Tanning Spas. (R. p. 45, Exhibits 1
and 2).
2.

On March 23,2007, the Tax Commission issued a Notice of Deficiency

Determination against Petitioner, Gracie, LLC stating that Petitioner, Gracie, LLC owed
$27,966.00 for use taxes and interest owed on equipment purchased for its Planet Beach
Tanning Spas. (R. p. 45, Exhibits 1 and 2).

3.

On April 26,200[7], a Written Petition for Redetermination of Notice of

Deficiency Determination Dated March 23,2006 was filed by Petitioner, Gracie, LLC
with the Tax Commission. (R. p. 45, Exhibits 1 and 2).
4.

On May 1,2007, a Written Petition for Redetermination of Notice of

Deficiency Determination Dated March 20,2007 was filed by Petitioner, Barnes &
Barnes Enterprises, LLC with the Tax Commission. (R. p. 45, Exhibits 1 and 2).
5.

On May 11,2007, the Tax Commission notified Petitioner, Gracie, LLC

that a proper tax protest had been filed. In that notification, the Tax Commission
enclosed a copy of an Idaho Board of Tax Appeals Decision entitled In the Matter of the
Appeal of Cowgirls Tanning Salon, Appeal. No. 05-B-1132 (August 8,2006). (R. p. 45,
Exhibits 1 and 2).
6.

On June 25,2007, an informal hearing was held before the Tax

Commission. No record was made of the hearing.
7.

On August 9,2007, the Tax Commission entered a Decision affirming the

Notice of Deficiency Determination entered against both Petitioners. (R. pp. 10 - 17).
8.

On July 14,2005, the Tax Comnission issued a "Seller's Permit" to

Gracie, LLC. (R. p. 45, Exhibits 1 and 2).

9.

On November 2,2007, Planet Beach filed a Petition for Judicial Review of

the Tax Commission's Decisions affirming the Deficiency Determination. (R. pp. 5 - 9).
C.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT
1.

On November 2,2007, Planet Beach filed a Petition for Judicial Review of

the Tax Commission's Decisions. (R. pp. 5 - 9).

2.

On Deceniber 4,2007, Tax Commission filed its Answer to Petition for

Judicial Review. (R. pp. 19 - 22).

3.

On July 16,2008, Planet Beach and Tax Commission filed in the district

court Stipulated Facts. (R. pp. 23 - 28).
4.

On November 25,2008, the district court heard argument on Planet

Beach's appeal from the Tax Commission's Decisions. The appeal was essentially heard
on cross-motions for sunnnary judgment. (R. p. 29).
5.

On December 24,2008, the district court filed its Memorandum Decision

and Order upholding the Tax Commission's Decisions finding Planet Beach owed use
taxes on its equipment purchases. (R. pp. 29 - 37).
6.

On February 3,2009, Planet Beach filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing the

district court's Memorandu~nDecision and Order. (R. pp. 38 - 40).

D.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Planet Beach and Tax Commission filed Stipulated Facts on July 16,2008. Those
facts need not be reiterated here. The district court, in its Memorandum Decision and
Order stated:
The tanning and spa equipment at each [Planet Beach] location is
located in individual rooms. Petitioners' employees control the use of all
tanning and spa equipment. Each piece of equipment is hooked up to, and
controlled by, a computer. When a customer wants to use a piece of
equipment, an employee turns it on using the computer at the front,desk.
Customers are unable to turn on the tanning and spa equipment from the
individual rooms. The employees also control the amount of time a
customer can spend in each piece of equipment. Following each use of a
tanning bed or piece of spa equipment by a customer, employees clean and
sanitize the tanning bed.

Customers are charged a fee to use a tanning bed or spa equipment.
The fee charged is based on the type of equipment used and the amount of
time the customer wants to use it. Sales tax is collected by Petitioners for
the fees charged. Customers can also purchase protective eyewear,
tanning lotions and skin care products at Planet Beach tanning spas. Sales
tax is collected from the sale of these items. Each month Petitioners remit
the sales taxes derived from the sale of their tanning services and retail
products to the State of Idaho. (Emphasis added).

(R. p. 30).
Petitioner, Gracie, LLC, d.b.a. Planet Beach, in year 2007, remitted sales tax to
the Idaho State Tax Commission for its customers' purchases of the use of tanning beds
and spa equipment in the amount of $37,354.42. Gracie, LLC remitted sales tax to the
Idaho State Tax Commission in the anlount of $1 1,773.88 for lotion and accessory sales
(e.g. eyewear) in 2007. The total remittance for sales tax in 2007 by Gracie, LLC was
$49,128.83. Sales tax is remitted on all sales made by Planet Beach. (R. p. 45, Exhibit 1,

paragraph 3).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Whether the taming and spa equipment purchased by Planet Beach constitutes a
sale subject to imposition of sales and use taxes pursuant to Idaho Code 9 63-3601 et seq.
where the use of the equipment is being sold or rented by Planet Beach as defined in
Idaho Code § 63-3612(2)(f) & (h).

ARGUMENT

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Fieldturf, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Admin., Div. of Public Works, 140 Idaho 385,
94 P.3d 690 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
"In reviewing the district court's decision on a motion for summary
judgment, the standard of review is whether there are any genuine issues
of material fact, and, if not, whether the prevailing party was entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Sacred Heavt Med. Ctr. V: Boundary
County, 138 Idaho 534,535,66 P.3d 238,239 (Idaho 2003). "If the
evidence shows no disputed issues of fact, what remains is a question of
law, over which the appellate court exercises free review." Id. Therefore,
legal questions resolved by a district court are subject to de novo review
by this Court. Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist., 128 Idaho 805,811,
919 P.2d 334, 340 (1996); see Iron Eagle Dev., L.L.C. v. Quality Design
Sys., Inc., 138 Idaho 487,491, 65 P.3d 509, 513 (2003).
140 Idaho at 387. In this action, there are no disputed issues of fact, only questions of
law relating to the interpretation of certain tax statutes.
In Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526,81 P.3d 1236 (2003), the Idaho Supreme
Court held:
The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which this Court
exercises free review. Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm 'n,
113 Idaho 959,961-62,751 P.2d 107, 109-10 (1988), overruled on other
grounds by J R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 120 Idaho 849,
820 P.2d 1206 (1991).

The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed
legislative intent is contrary or plain meaning leads to absurd results.
George W Watkins Family, 118 Idaho at 540,797 P.2d at 1388.
139 Idaho at 528.
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In AIA Sew. Cow. v. Idaho State Tax Conxn'n, 136 Idaho 84,30 P.3d 962
(2001), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
Generally, "The Idaho Income Tax Act, like all tax statutes, must be
construed as favorably as possible to the taxpayer and strictly against the
taxing authority." Futuva Corp. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 92 Idaho 288,291,
442 P.2d 174,177 (1968).
136 Idaho at 187. See also, In re Potlatch Forests. Inc., 72 Idaho 291,240 P.2d 242
(1952) and Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v. Balderston, 58 Idaho 692,78 P.2d 105 (1938).

PLANET BEACH IS NOT OBLIGATED TO PAY IDAI-I0 USE TAX
ON TANNING BEDS AND SPA EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY
PLANET BEACH PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 6 63-3601 ET SEQ
Idaho Code 5 63-3621 provides in part

63-3621. Imposition and rate of the use tax - Exemptions. -An
excise tax is hereby imposed on the storage, use, or other consumption in
this state of tangible personal property acquired on or after October 1,
2006, for storage, use, or other consumption in this state at the rate of six
percent (6%) of the value of the property, and a recent sales price shall be
presumptive evidence of the value of the property unless the property is
wireless telecommunications equipment, in which case a recent sales price
shall be conclusive evidence of the value of the property.
(a) Every person storing, using, or otherwise consuming, in this state,
tangible personal property is liable for the tax. His liability is not
extinguished until the tax has been paid to this state.

(b) Every retailer engaged in business in this state, and making sales of
tangible personal propeftv for the storage. use, or other consumution in
this state, not exempted under section 63-3622, Idaho Code, shall. at the
time of making the sales or, of storage, use or other consumption of the
tangible personal property is not then taxable hereunder, at the time the
storage, use or other consumption becomes taxable, collect the tax from
the purchaser and give to the purchaser a receipt therefore in the manner
and form prescribed by the state tax comnission. (Emphasis added).
Idaho Code 9 63-3615 provides in part:
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63-3615. Storage - Use. - (a) The term "storage" includes any keeping
or retention in this state for any purpose except sale in the regular course
of business or subsequent use solely outside this state of tangible personal
property purchased from a retailer.
(b) The term "use" includes the exercise of any right or power over
tangible personal property incident to the ownership or the leasing of that
property or the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal
property by any person in the perfomlance of a contract, or to fulfill
contract or subcontract obligations, whether the title of such property be in
the subcontracior, contractor, contraciee, subcontraciee, or any other
person, or whether the titleholder of such property would be subject to the
sales or use tax, unless such property would be exempt to the titleholder
under section 63-3622D, Idaho Code, except that the term "use" does not
include the sale of that propertv in the regular course of business.
(Emphasis added).
The tanning and spa equipment purchased by Planet Beach is defined by statute as
"tangible personal property." Idaho Code 9 63-3616 provides in part:
63-3616. Tangible personal property. - (a) the term "tangible
personal property" means personal property which may be seen, weighed,
measured, felt or touched, or which is in any other manner perceptible to
the senses.
Planet Beach is not storing, using or otherwise consuming tanning and spa equipment by
statutory definition. Planet: Beach is selling and/or renting the use of tanning and spa
equipment at each of its locations and is collecting sales tax on each use andior rental it
sells. Paragraph 9 of the Stipulated Facts agreed upon by Planet Beach and Tax
Commission states:

9. At all six (6) locations, Petitioners have tanning and spa equipment
located in individual rooms. For a fee, a customer is entitled to use a
tanning bed or piece of spa equipment for a certain period of time. Sales
tax is collected on all fees charged and collected by Petitioners and
remitted to the Idaho State Tax Commission monthly pursuant to Idaho
Code $63-3612(2)(f). The fee varies depending on the type of tanning
bed or piece of spa equipment the custoiner wants to use.
(R. p. 25). In year 2007, Petitioner, Gracie, LLC, d.b.a. Planet Beach, remitted sales tax
to the Tax Commission in the amount of $37,354.42 for its customers' purchase of the

APPELLANT'S BRIEF -Page 3

use of tanning beds and spa equipment and $1 1,773.88 for lotion and accessory sales.
The total remittance for sales tax in 2007 by Petitioner, Gracie, LLC for its three (3)
locations was $49,128.83. (R. p. 45, Exhibit 1, p. 2, paragraph 3).
Idaho Code 5 63-3612 provides in part:
63-3612. Sale. - (1) The term "sale" means any transfer of title,
exchange or barter, conditional or otherwise, of tangible personal property
for a consideration and shall include any similar transfer of possession
found by the state tax commission to be in lieu of, or equivalent to, a
transfer of title, exchange or barter.
(2) "Sale" shall alsoinclude the following transactions when a
consideratioli is transferred, exchanged or bartered:

(f) The use of or the privilege of using tangible personal property or
facilities for recreation.

(h) The lease or rental of tangible personal property.
Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "rent" in part as follows:
Rent. Consideration paid for use or occupation of property. In a broader
sense, it is the compensation or fee paid, usually periodically,
fany property, land, buildings, equipment, etc.

Black's Law Dictionary 673 (5'h ed. 1983). Because Planet Beach is not storing, using or
otherwise consuming tanning and spa equipment, Planet Beach is not required to pay a
use tax pursuant to Idaho Code 5 63-3621 on its purchase of that equipment.

THE TAX COMMISSION AND THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT
CONSTRUING IDAHO CODE 6 63-3601 ET SEO. AS FAVORABLY AS POSSIBLE
TO PLANET BEACH AND STRICTLY AGAINST THE TAX COMMISSION
As cited above, the Idaho Supreme Court, in AIA Serv. Cow. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 136 Idalio 84, 30 P.3d 962 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
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Generally, "The Idaho Income Tax Act, like all statutes, must be
construed as favorably as possible to the taxpayer and strictly against the
taxing authority." Futuva Covp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 92 Idaho 288,291,
442 P.2d 174, 177 (1968).
136 Idaho at 187. See also, in re Potlatch Forests. Inc., 72 Idaho 291,240 P.2d 242
(1952) and Idaho Gold Dredging Co. v. Balderston, 58 Idaho 692,78 P.2d 105 (1938). In
its decision upholding the Deficiency Determinaiion against Planet Beach the Tax
Commission held:
The Tax Commission has long held that sales of tanning services are
charges for the privilege of using tangible personal property of facilities
for recreation and therefore included within the definition of "sale" in
Idaho Code 9 63-3612(2)(f).

As noted earlier, the Colnnlissioner has ruled that the beds are not
purchased for resale.
(R. p. 45, Ex. 2, Exhibit G, p. 2). The Tax Conmission then cites Boise Bowling Center
v. State of Idaho, 93 Idaho 367,461 P.2d 262 (1969) to support its decision. The Tax

Commission chooses to interpret Idaho Code 5 63-3612 as favorably as possible to itself
instead of the tax payer.
In Energy S~uared,Inc. v. Arizona Department of Revenue, 203 Ariz. 507,56
P.3d 686 (2002), the Arizona Court was dealing with an alinost identical fact pattern
involving a tanning salon, except that the Arizona Department of Revenue was asserting
that the tanning salon was not offering a service, but was in fact renting tanning beds and
booths in an effort to collect taxes on the rental sale. (56 P.3d at 507). In ruling in favor
of the taming salon, the Arizona Court of Appeals held:

7 19 Although both sides' characterizations of the taxpaver's business
activities are reasonable and plausible, two considerations lead us to prefer
that offered by the taxpayer.
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7

20 First, the question whether the legislature intended activities like
those of the taxpayer to fall within A.R.S. 6 42-5071(A) is not clear.
Uncertainty about the scope and meaning of a taxing provision is to be
resolved in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing autlioritv. Ci@ of
Phoenix v. Borden Co., 84 Ariz. 250,252-53,326 P.2d 841, 843 (1958)
(any doubts about meaning of statute that iinposes tax are to be determined
in taxpayer's favor); accord Shamrock Foods Co. v. City ofphoenix, 157
Ariz. 286,288,757 P.2d 90,92 (1988).

7

21 Additionally. our supreme court has made it clear that the scope and
application of A.R.S. 6 42-5071(A) and its predecessor hinges on the
degree of control over the property in question that is ceded to its putative
"lessee" or "renter." See State Tax Commission v. Peck, 106 Ariz. 394,
476 P.2d 849 (1970). Peck dealt with the analogous question whether the
business of coin-operated self-service laundries and car washes constituted
leasing or renting tangible personal property for a consideration. To
resolve this issue, the Peck court adopted a dictionary definition of the
verb "to rent":
Webster's Third International dictionary defines the verb "to rent" as
"(1) to take and hold under an agreement to pay rent," or "(2) to obtain
the possession and use of a place or article for rent."

Id. at 396.476 P.2d at 851. The court determined that:
There is no question that when customers use the equipment on the
premises of the plaintiffs herein, such customers have an exclusive use
of the equipment for a fixed period of time and for payment of a fixed
amount of money. It is also true that the customers themselves
exclusiveiy control all manual operations necessary to run the
machines. In our view such exclusive use and control comes within
the meaning of the term "renting" as used in the statute.

[Tlhe operation of plaintiffs' businesses is characterized by the lack
of personal services provided by the owner.

Id. (Emphasis added).
56 P.3d at 689. The Arizona Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the tanning salon
primarily because it was construing the Arizona revenue statutes as favorably as possible
to the tanning salon and against the tax commission. Further, the Arizona Court had
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previously interpreted and ruled what rental meant under the Arizona revenue statutes.
The Idaho Supreme Court has not made such a ruling.
Like Arizona, it is not clear whether or not the legislature intended activities like
Planet Beach's providing the use of tanning beds and spa equipment to fall within the
scope of Idaho Code 3 63-3612(2)(h). The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals decision in In
the Matter of the Appeal of Cowrzirls' Tanning Salon, Appeal No. 05-B-1132 (August 8,
2006) makes it clear that even the Board of Tax Appeals considered Cowgirls' activities
as "close to the line of demarcation" as to rental. (R. p. 45, Ex. 2, Exhibit F, p. 4).
However, the Board of Tax Appeals resolved the "ambiguity in favor of the Tax
Commission." This result was clearly contrary to well established Idaho law that tax
statvtes must be construed as favorably as possible to the tax payer and strictly against
the taxing authority. AIA Serv. Com. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n., 136 Idaho 184, 187,
30 P.3d 962,965 (2001). In contrast, the Arizona Court of Appeals correctly chose to
follow well established law and resolve the ambiguity in favor of the taxpayer.
In the case at bar, the Tax Commission and the district court erred by not
interpreting Idaho Code 5 63-3612(2)(f) & (h) as favorably as possible to Planet Beach as
Planet Beach's sale of the use of tanning and spa equipment should clearly be construed
as a rental under Idaho Code 3 63-3612(2)(f) & (h).

IV .

The district court in tliis action ruled:

In the Court's view, the decision in Boise Bowling Center v. State is
dispositive on the issue raised in tliis appeal. In this case Planet Beach
provides iannirig arid related services to its customers, and it is the
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combination of these services that the customer is charged for. Each
customer is provided with the use of an individual room that has been
cleaned and sanitized by an employee following each customer use, the
use of tanning or spa equipment and assistance in turning the equipment
on and off. Customers are unable to turn on the tanning and spa
equipment from the individual rooms. Customers are unable to rent the
tanning machine by itself and do not have the option of cleaning and
sanitizing the equipment themselves. Customers also purchase lotions and
other products related to the tanning process. Like the bowling patrons in
the Boise Bowling Center case, customers of Planet Beach spas are paying
for a service package when they use tanning and spa equipment.
Court finds that Petitioners are not re-sellinrr the use of the tanning and spa
equipment, and as such, are subject to liability for payment of the Idaho
use tax for the tanning and spa equipment they purchased from their out of
state franchisor.

(R. pp. 35 - 36). The district court's reliance on Boise Bowling Center v. State of Idaho,
93 Idaho 367,461 P.2d 262 (1969) is in error. In that case, the Bowling Center was
primarily selling the use of a bowling lane which also included the use of pin setting
equipment. A bowling lane h i s tangible personal property. It is a fixture attached to
real properly. In Boise Bowling Center v. State of Idaho, 93 Idaho 367,461 P.2d 262
(1969), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
I.C. s 63-3612(h) defines as a sale, receipts from the lease or rental of
tangible personal property.
As the statute clearly indicates a sale or leasing of tangible personal
property for any other purpose than resale or releasing that property is a
retail sale. Given this information the only question remaining is whether
or not the respondent proprietors re-sell or re-lease the equipment
originally leased to them. If they do, the transaction between A.M.F. and
the owners of the bowling establishments loses the taint of being classified
as a 'retail sale' and is not taxable under the act.
We will now analyze the function of the leased automatic pinsetting
machines and specifically with respect to whether or not it can fairly be
said that these machines &e re-rented or re-leased by the proprietors of the
bowling establishments to their customers. Operation of a bowling
business involves providing the bowling patron with a diverse assortment
of services and properties, vix., use of a bowling ball, use of the bowling
alley upon which the ball is thrown, use of a score sheet, and use of the
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automatic pinsetting machine.
It is the combination of these services and properties for which a charge is
exacted by the proprietor of the establishment. The bowling patron does
not rent the automatic pinsetting device by itself but rather rents or pavs a
fee for a 'package' or bowling service which is supplied by the proprietor.
(Emphasis added).
93 Idaho at 369. In Boise Bowlin~Center, the pinsetting equipment is but an incident of
what the bowling patron is paying the use of. The same cannot be said when a Planet
Beach customer pays for the use or rental of a piece of tanning or spa equipment. In fact,
the fee the customer is charged is based solely on the type of equipment being used. (R.
p. 25, paragraph 9). Because Planet Beach charges a usage or rental fee based upon the
equipment used, Planet Beach's purchase of that equipment is not taxable.

THE TAX COMMISSION AND THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ARBITRARILY
RULING THAT THE TANNING AND SPA EQUIPMENT ARE COMPONENTS
OF A "FACILITY" IN VIOLATION OF THE IDAHO STATE CONSTITUTION
Both the Tax Commission and district court ruled that customers of Planet Beach
spas are paying for a service package when they use tanning and spa equipment and
therefore, Planet Beach is not reselling the use of the tanning and spa equipment. (R. pp.
35 - 36). The district court ruled that Planet Beach customers also purchase lotions and
other products related to the tamling process. This is true, but the undisputed evidence is
that those lotions and products are not sold as part of a package. (R. p. 27, paragraph 15).
The district court ruled:
[Planet Beach] customers are unable to rent the tanning machine by itself
and do not have the option of cleaning and sanitizing the equipment
themselves.
(R. p. 35). Planet Beach customers are paying for the use or rental of the particular
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tanning and spa equipment for a fee based upon the equipment they choose to use. (R. p.
25, paragraph 25). This falls under the definition of "rent" as is set forth in Black's Law
Dictionary. What else are Planet Beach customers "renting" when they use a piece of
tanning or spa equipment? The fact that Planet Beach chooses to clean and sanitize the
beds is irrelevant. Surely automobile rental companies clean and wash each rental car in
between each customer's use. Cleaning and sanitizing the tanning and spa equipment is
not a service. It is a good business practice as it is doubtM a customer would want to
pay for the use of equipment that was not cleaned and sanitized. The fact that the tanning
and spa equipment is located in individual rooms is incidentalto the use of the equipment.
Use of tanning and spa equipment requires disrobing. Customers are very unlikely to
disrobe in a lobby or other area open to the public. Planet Beach does not charge a fee on
the basis of the room the equipment is located in. Nowhere in Idaho Code 5 63-3612(h)
does it state that use or rental of equipment cannot accompany other items in order to be
construed as reselling that equipment.
In In the Matter of the Appeal of Cowgirl's Tanning Salon, Appeal No. 05-B1132 (2006), the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals made the following finding:
The STC however holds that customers' purchase of a tanning service
may include not only a tanning bed, but a private room, towels, lotion and
goggles or other protective supplies; i.e. it is the.purchase of the whole
tanning facility which is considered akin to renting a bowling lane and the
associated pin setting equipment, shoes, and bowling ball (Boise Bowling
Cenlev v. State, 93 Idaho 367 (1969).)

(R. p. 45 Ex. 2, Exhibit F, p. 4). The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals went on to hold:
Appellant presented other arguments which are not persuasive.
not to say a customer's tanning service ~urchaseis not largely related to
the tanning bed. The case is closer to the "demarcation line" than many
*.
Ultimately however, the Board concludes that customers are
primarily paying for a recreational service that involves the use of a
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facility and its varied services. It is not reasonable to characterize the
tanning service purchase, at a salon location, as the rental of a tanning bed
(single piece of equipment.) (Emphasis added).

(R. p. 45 Ex. 2, Exhibit F, p. 4). Where is the demarcation line? Who decides what is a
reasonable characterization? Certainly tbe Tax Commission's ruling is not based on
statutory language. Otherwise, the Tax Commission would point to that language.
Clearly it is some arbitrary line that the Tax Commission seeks to establish. Because of
the arbitrariness, the Tax Commission is violating Article VII § 5 of the Idaho State
Constitution which requires taxes to be uniform. This brings us full circle back to the
interpretation of Idaho Code 5 63-3612.
In Ada County Highway District v. Total Success Investments. LLC, 145 Idaho
360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court held:
Courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its
constitutionality.
179 P.3d at 332. Further, tax statutes must be construed as favorably as possible to the
taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority. AIA Serv. Corn. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm'n, 136 Idaho 184, 187,30 P.3d 962,965 (2001). Clearly, Planet Beach is selling
the use of tanning beds and spa equipment. The Tax Commission and the district court
are construing Idaho Code $63-3612(2)(f) & (h) in an arbitrary and unconstitutional
manner.

CONCLUSION
The district Court's Decision upholding the Tax Commission's Notice of
Deficiency should be reversed and the Idaho Supreme Court should rule that the purchase
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of tanning and spa equipment by Planet Beach is not taxable under the sales tax act.
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